Sana’a – SABA | Report by: Jamil Al-Qashm
A decade of challenges and hardships has written a new chapter of national resilience. During this period, the Sana’a government redefined the concept of governance under siege, transforming limited resources into comprehensive development pathways—while the occupied provinces suffer administrative and financial collapse despite abundant resources, amid the failure of the “mercenary government” to provide basic services and the worsening of rampant corruption.
Since the outbreak of the September 21 Revolution, the Sana’a government has prioritized rebuilding state institutions, even as the US-Saudi-Emirati aggression deliberately targeted Yemen’s institutional infrastructure. Instead of collapsing, the government maintained growing administrative cohesion, while the rival administration pursued fragmentation and plundered national resources for the benefit of elites.
The occupied provinces are run through a model of political rentierism, with oil and gas revenues from Shabwa and Hadramout siphoned into foreign bank accounts, while cities remain in darkness, essential services deteriorate, and crises in electricity, water, and education escalate, fueling continuous public outrage.
In contrast, the Sana’a government emerged as a heartbeat of good governance. It passed legislation promoting local production and supporting vulnerable social groups. One landmark example is the tax exemption law for small taxpayers and enterprises—demonstrating Sana’a’s socio-economic vision for inclusive development.
The General Authority for Zakat has become a strategic pillar in supporting vulnerable segments, with annual contributions in the tens of billions of riyals—surpassing what the former Duties Authority delivered over decades. It has launched extensive empowerment programs that reestablished zakat as a development resource rather than a mere revenue stream.
Despite the transfer of Central Bank powers to occupied Aden, Sana’a acted to protect depositors, launching a compensation mechanism for damaged currency, replacing over 2.2 billion riyals—showcasing its national responsibility while the rival government failed to inspire trust in the banking sector.
In agriculture, the Sana’a government launched the largest projects in decades, including a memorandum of understanding for a 20-billion-riyal agricultural revival and cultivation of 150,000 hectares in the Tihama Plain and 57,000 reclaimed hectares across various provinces—laying a foundation for food sovereignty.
The contract farming project marked a qualitative leap, redefining the relationship between state and farmer, enhancing food security, and reducing import dependency. A strategic wheat cultivation initiative in the central highlands of Dhamar province also contributed to achieving self-sufficiency.
In Al-Jawf, the Martyr Al-Sammad Project symbolized production enhancement through cultivating nearly 10,000 hectares—transforming this desert province into a promising grain hub. Al-Hodeidah witnessed notable expansion in soybean, millet, corn, and other vital crops.
Infrastructure achievements included 2,931 road projects across 155 districts—benefiting around five million citizens—funded and supported by community initiatives, creating new arteries for services and goods flow.
In energy, 57 solar energy projects were completed across 13 provinces, and 126 water pumping systems in rural areas were converted to sustainable sources—making a tangible impact on daily life, especially in contrast to Aden’s inability to secure fuel or electricity.
Education was also prioritized, with the construction and rehabilitation of thousands of schools, provision of furniture and supplies, and teacher training programs aimed at improving education in remote areas, reducing dropouts, and enhancing learning outcomes.
To mitigate disasters, 53 flood and landslide protection projects were implemented, including drainage canals, diversion dams, and water barriers in vulnerable rural and lowland areas. These projects benefited over 146,000 citizens and reduced human and material losses during rainy seasons—signifying an effective early disaster response system.
To alleviate the impacts of aggression, the government launched a national salary program covering 430 main and subsidiary government units, benefiting over 300,000 public employees monthly—about 82% of units formerly reliant on the public budget.
The program indirectly supports over 2.1 million people, with an average of 300,000 funding operations per month and an annual total of approximately 3.6 million transactions—part of an exceptional mechanism to provide salaries and reimburse small depositors, reaffirming the government’s commitment to social protection amid complex economic conditions.
Community initiatives have been a vital partner in this rebuilding journey, with public contributions exceeding 5 billion riyals in one year across 682 agricultural and fisheries projects, supported and guided by state institutions. Meanwhile, in occupied provinces, corruption and exclusion hinder any meaningful civic engagement.
Agricultural cooperatives evolved from basic organizational structures into active production centers, taking on advanced roles in planning and implementing rural development projects—including agriculture, livestock production, and local marketing.
With direct government support, cooperative personnel were trained and equipped administratively and technically, and linked to financing programs, enabling local communities to lead collective and sustainable development, turning rural Yemen into a dynamic space of economic and social revival.
The government also launched a program to transform cities into centers for value-added agro-industrial production. This included supporting the establishment of small workshops and processing units, and offering incentives to home-based producers and local entrepreneurs—boosting the local economy and adding value to local resources.
The financial sector saw continued reform, with Central Bank decisions in Sana’a regulating money exchange firms, curbing speculation, and protecting the financial system—while Aden suffers from financial chaos and dwindling reserves.
Recognizing the value of investing in human capital, the Sana’a government carried out broad administrative and structural reforms, restructuring public service units, modernizing institutional work systems, and activating monitoring and evaluation tools. Key performance indicators were adopted in vital sectors—raising government efficiency and reinforcing the concept of public service as a national responsibility requiring discipline and standards.
These accomplishments were not merely theoretical—they materialized on the ground, from lit streets and improved cities to coffee drying plants and vast harvests of millet and corn in Tihama and other provinces.
Across multiple provinces, tangible development indicators are evident in roads, water, agriculture, community initiatives, land reclamation, dam construction, crop cultivation, equipment provision, and improved local production—all achieved amid the rubble of aggression and siege-imposed challenges.
In the occupied provinces, signs of total collapse are evident—developmental vision is absent, services are run through corruption and favoritism, worsening citizen suffering and widening the gap. State institutions have become tools of exploitation rather than development incubators, burdening citizens who face daily struggles for basic needs.
These ten years have not only reshaped the power map, but redefined the meaning of the state—from a consumerist center to a productive society, from political façade to service-driven institution, from a regime under siege to a leadership that builds and governs with capability and independence—moving with confident steps that reflect deep vision and steadfast direction.
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