SANA'A June 11. 2024 (Saba) - Israeli writer Ben Caspit has revealed that former minister in the Israeli war government, Gadi Eisenkot, who withdrew with his colleague from the Blue and White Party, Benny Gantz, from the War Council, had presented a set of demands to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the most important of which was to start attacking the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, but the latter did not do so, desiring to prolong the duration of the war.
The writer pointed out in an article in Maariv newspaper to the secret document leaked by journalist Ron Abraham of Channel 12 last February, which included Eisenkot's vision of the course of the war after the seventh of last October, and highlighted what he said were clauses that were not revealed before from this document, indicating the depth of the disagreement between him and Netanyahu.
The revelation of the document at the time caused a stir in the Israeli entity as it was issued by a former chief of staff of the occupation army, in addition to his popularity and sympathy following the killing of his son on December seventh when Palestinian resistance fighters detonated a booby-trapped tunnel in an Israeli force in the outskirts of Jabalia north of the Gaza Strip.
The writer said that the main content of the document, one of 8 documents presented by Eisenkot, was that "the Netanyahu government and the War Council do not make the necessary strategic decisions to manage the war and achieve accomplishments"... indicating that Eisenkot did not speak of absolute victory, realizing its impossibility in the short term.
The Israeli writer said: Eisenkot realizes the necessary time to achieve a significant accomplishment, and he has known from the very beginning that Netanyahu fabricated a fake goal, which is "absolute victory," and then fabricated another goal, "more stupidity called Rafah," according to his expression.
He pointed out that the parts of the document that were not published confirmed that Eisenkot and Gantz believed that "military pressure should be intensified and efforts should be made to engage in Rafah and in the central camps as well... this document was written on February 15... and despite this request, Netanyahu continued to drag his feet for his own reasons, perhaps because he wanted to extend the war indefinitely."
Whatever Eisenkot decides in the document, "the decisions that must be made are not made, so the Zionist enemy army remains in place, accomplishments are lost in vain, and the state loses strategic arsenals and historical opportunities."
H.H
The writer pointed out in an article in Maariv newspaper to the secret document leaked by journalist Ron Abraham of Channel 12 last February, which included Eisenkot's vision of the course of the war after the seventh of last October, and highlighted what he said were clauses that were not revealed before from this document, indicating the depth of the disagreement between him and Netanyahu.
The revelation of the document at the time caused a stir in the Israeli entity as it was issued by a former chief of staff of the occupation army, in addition to his popularity and sympathy following the killing of his son on December seventh when Palestinian resistance fighters detonated a booby-trapped tunnel in an Israeli force in the outskirts of Jabalia north of the Gaza Strip.
The writer said that the main content of the document, one of 8 documents presented by Eisenkot, was that "the Netanyahu government and the War Council do not make the necessary strategic decisions to manage the war and achieve accomplishments"... indicating that Eisenkot did not speak of absolute victory, realizing its impossibility in the short term.
The Israeli writer said: Eisenkot realizes the necessary time to achieve a significant accomplishment, and he has known from the very beginning that Netanyahu fabricated a fake goal, which is "absolute victory," and then fabricated another goal, "more stupidity called Rafah," according to his expression.
He pointed out that the parts of the document that were not published confirmed that Eisenkot and Gantz believed that "military pressure should be intensified and efforts should be made to engage in Rafah and in the central camps as well... this document was written on February 15... and despite this request, Netanyahu continued to drag his feet for his own reasons, perhaps because he wanted to extend the war indefinitely."
Whatever Eisenkot decides in the document, "the decisions that must be made are not made, so the Zionist enemy army remains in place, accomplishments are lost in vain, and the state loses strategic arsenals and historical opportunities."
H.H
resource : Saba